

August 25, 2012

**The Doomsday Machines:
Confessions of an American Nuclear War Planner**

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Preface

At the same time I copied the 47 volumes, 7000 Top Secret pages of the Pentagon Papers from my office at the RAND Corporation in 1969-70, I also copied an even larger number of other classified documents and pages. These included the entire contents of my top secret safe. I intended to release these to Congress and the public after the publication of the Vietnam Study, probably after my first trial.

These other documents included some Vietnam studies I had done for the Nixon Administration, but mainly they consisted of my classified notes from years of Top Secret work on nuclear war planning, command and control of nuclear weapons, and participation in and studies of nuclear crises. They included verbatim extracts or copies of crucial documents, plans, studies and cables, and classified studies by others.

One of the latter was a Top Secret Kissinger study for Nixon (NSSM-3) that examined current and proposed nuclear attack options. The *smallest* attack option available to President Nixon in 1969 was calculated to kill 90 million people.

These nuclear-related data over the previous decade were what, above all, I felt called on to disclose to the American public and Congress, much more than the Vietnam Study itself. I gave priority to releasing the latter only because bombs were falling at that time on Vietnam.

I felt it was especially important for me to disclose our long-term recklessness with respect to nuclear threats and war. I was prepared and fully expected to go to prison for life, if not for the initial release of the Pentagon Papers, then for the subsequent disclosures on nuclear policy that I saw as more important (and which were much more closely guarded from public knowledge).

This did not come about, and has remained secret, because most of the nuclear documents were lost. They were buried in a field for safekeeping by my brother and subsequently displaced by a hurricane (!) It was not until my trial for the Pentagon Papers was ended that I finally accepted that our efforts to locate them were futile and that they were irrecoverable.

Forty years later, though some of these documents have been declassified in part, most of the contents of what I meant to reveal then has remained in government safes, as secret from the public and Congress as my buried copies. I now propose to disclose in as much

detail as possible what I have been describing more briefly over the years to concerned members of Congress and in interviews and lectures, sometimes to captive audiences of fellow anti-nuclear resisters in jails.

Introduction: A Mass Murder Mystery (see sample chapter)

- A Joint Chiefs of Staff memo--Top Secret, Eyes Only for the President—reveals to me that the annual operational plan for general nuclear war proposes in a wide range of circumstances to kill 600 million people: Soviets, Chinese, satellite nations, West Europe and neutrals. (Later studies show this to be roughly half of the actual foreseeable deaths. Still later studies reveal their possibility of extinguishing most complex life on earth, via nuclear winter.)
- Humans—American humans—knowingly created this instrument of mass murder; some years later, the Soviets imitated it. The two Doomsday Machines still exist, on alert. The mystery: how did this come about? With what motives? What interests have maintained them? How close have they come to being triggered? Can they be dismantled?

1. “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing”

1. The Bomb, My Father, and Me: “An Evil Thing in Any Light”

- In 1944 a class of 13-year-olds, of which I am a member, spends a week considering for a required essay what the implications would be for the world of a Uranium-235 bomb--1000 times more powerful than existing block-busters--coming into existence. We easily conclude that this would be bad news for humanity, no matter who had it first.
- Some nine months later, on August 6, 1945, I recognize the subject of our project in the headlines: the Bomb was here, and even though it was invented by Americans, it had been used already, on a city. I have a sense of dread not shared by most Americans, whose first thoughts of this weapon are that it is bringing victory and saving lives.
- Another mystery, mirroring and perhaps illuminating the larger one: how did this boy, already horrified by the terror bombing associated with the Nazis and alerted even prior to Hiroshima to the still-greater terrors of atomic weapons, grow up to become a nuclear war planner?

2. The Making of a Cold Warrior

- My senior year in high-school and early years in college, the Cold War emerges, with an engulfing ideology: Stalin=Hitler. The Truman Doctrine, Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin Blockade (Truman's first public threats of nuclear first-use, sending B-29s to Britain), Hiss and Rosenberg, fall of China, Soviet A-bomb. Korea: US/UN response to aggression (where Eisenhower secretly threatens nuclear first-use). After student deferments, I volunteer for officer training in the Marine Corps. (During my first weeks at Quantico, Eisenhower offers nuclear weapons to the French to rescue Dienbienphu.) In 1956 I extend my two-year tour to accompany my [lppopbattalion to the Mediterranean in expectation of the Suez Crisis (which brings nuclear threats from Khrushchev).

3. Decision Making Under Uncertainty & A Theory of Threats

- Back at Harvard in the Society of Fellows, I continue my study of decision-making under uncertainty, the subject of my undergraduate honors thesis, and extend to an analysis of bargaining and threats. My Lowell Lectures on *The Art of Coercion* include "Theory and Practice of Blackmail" and "The Political Uses of Madness," the latter analyzing Hitler's successful threats in the Thirties and drawing an analogy to Khrushchev's current nuclear threats over Berlin.

4. "Presidents as Perfect Detonators": Nuclear Threats & "The Political Uses of Madness"

- By invitation, I repeat that lecture to Henry Kissinger's graduate seminar at Harvard. (A dozen years later, as President Nixon is secretly enacting what he privately calls his "madman theory" by nuclear threats against North Vietnam, Kissinger recalls this lecture in my presence at San Clemente. "I have learned more from Dan Ellsberg," he tells my companion Lloyd Shearer, "than from anyone else on the subject of bargaining." Flattering, but a hair-raising allusion by the president's assistant for national security to a Hitlerian strategy.)

5. Sputnik & the Spectre Haunting RAND: A Nuclear Surprise Attack/Pearl Harbor

- As a summer consultant at the RAND Corporation in 1958, I join "the Wizards of Armageddon," the major theorists of deterrence: Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Andrew Marshall, Harry Rowen and others. From classified discussion and studies, I come quickly to share their obsession: deterring a near-term Soviet nuclear surprise attack.

- The problem my colleagues and I focus on day and night: how to maintain reliably the retaliatory capability to kill as many Russians as possible—more than the Soviets had suffered in World War II-- after a Soviet surprise attack with superior missile forces, a disarming first strike that would exploit vulnerabilities Wohlsetter and the other theorists had discerned in our retaliatory capabilities.
- In effect, I join an apocalyptic cult, regarded skeptically by most of those without clearances, but buttressed by CIA estimates of an impending “missile gap” and by the sense of urgency and the charismatic brilliance of my mentors.

Part II: Hidden Histories

6. Doomsday Machines [& the Ultimate Decision]

Nuclear Delegation: Ultimate Decision

- At RAND as a full-time employee in the summer of 1959, I am led by my academic studies to focus on a preeminent problem of decision-making under uncertainty: a president’s choice of executing the nuclear war plans, or not, in circumstances of ambiguous warning or ongoing conventional war.
- In a task force studying this “nuclear command and control” problem in the Pacific theater, I become familiar—probably more so than any other civilian at the time—with the structure of plans and alert procedures for general nuclear war, and with their contradictions and peculiarities. (see sample chapter) These include:
 - Secret delegation of presidential authority to initiate nuclear war in various circumstances to theater commanders (in contrast to publicly declared policy declared to this day, asserting falsely that this authority rests solely with the president under all circumstances);
 - Sub-delegation of this authority to subordinate commanders, and simple assumption of authority at some low tactical levels. In short, many fingers on the button;
 - Lack of any plan at that time for fighting Russians anywhere without simultaneously obliterating China, along with the Soviet Bloc;
 - Lack of provision for any reserve force or alternative targeting options: all-or-nothing plans against a fixed target list, what Herman Kahn termed “spasm war” (or “wargasm”);

- Under all circumstances of general war—defined secretly as “armed conflict [involving more than a brigade or two] with the Soviet Union” (as, perhaps, over Berlin, Iran, Yugoslavia)—all planning called for the inexorable obliteration of every city in the Soviet Union and China, killing over three hundred million people;
- “Collateral damage” to civilians from attacks on nearby military or industrial targets was regarded as “bonus,” to be maximized rather than avoided, in the Soviet Union and China; and casualties from fallout in the satellites, West Europe and neighboring neutral states (Afghanistan, Finland, Japan, India...) was accepted on the scale of hundreds of millions, for an estimated total death toll of some six hundred million;
- Plans were almost entirely premised on the desirability and expectation of a U.S. first strike, either preemptively on ambiguous warning or escalating from a limited, non-nuclear conflict: not, as in the public mind, retaliating to actual unambiguous arrival of attacking warheads;
- Contrary to public agreements with Japan, nuclear weapons were routinely aboard U.S. Navy ships in Japanese harbors, and were permanently stationed in tidal waters of Japan off at Iwakuni Marine Air Base;
- Lack of locks on nuclear weapons preventing deliberate unauthorized launch or detonation. (Such “permissive action links” first introduced under JFK for tactical and allied weapons were resisted for years by the Strategic Air Command and much longer on Navy submarines);
- Deliberate omission of any “Stop” code once bombers had been released to attack (as dramatized in the movie: *Dr. Strangelove*), making it impossible to halt an attack based on a false alarm or unauthorized action or in case of enemy surrender during the many hours of bomber flight;
- Universal disregard or bypassing of “two-man rules” meant to prevent one man from launching strikes without authenticated authorization;
- Significant possibilities of accidents involving nuclear weapons and major false alarms (both frequently experienced) and of unauthorized launch.

In sum, I discover that *Dr. Strangelove* was a documentary.

7. A Hundred Holocausts: Confronting the Machine

- I spend the Christmas season, 1960, in a high-level task force for Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates helping design a command system to preserve presidential

control under Soviet surprise attack. Nevertheless, despite my reports and recommendations on many of the above anomalies and dangers, my warnings and those of others bring about little change under Eisenhower. (Half a century later, most of my notes and files of this period are still guarded in RAND or Pentagon safes, or lost and buried under a dumpsite near Tarrytown, New York.)

- When the new Secretary of Defense under Kennedy, Robert McNamara, brings a crew from RAND, the so-called “whiz kids,” to work for him at the Pentagon—including my boss at RAND Charlie Hitch and my friends Harry Rowen and Alain Enthoven—I become a consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense, spending up to half the year in Washington, 1961-64. I have the run of the documents on Rowen’s desk.
- After briefing the president’s assistant for national security, McGeorge Bundy, on most of the problems described above, he names me as a one-man investigation of the delegation of presidential nuclear authority (though ultimately, against my recommendation, Kennedy secretly continues the Eisenhower delegation and sub-delegation, “rather than reverse the decision of the Great General,” as Bundy’s deputy puts it).
- Rowen assigns to me the preeminent opportunity to right what I see wrong in the Eisenhower-era plans and procedures by drafting the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), President Kennedy’s top secret guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the annual operational plans for general nuclear war.
- Earlier BNSP’s under Eisenhower are brief, three or four pages; my thoroughgoing revision is almost twenty pages, reversing earlier policy in detail. Eventually my draft, unchanged, is issued by McNamara as SecDef Guidance to the JCS, accompanied by implementing instructions to the Strategic Air Command (also drafted in large part by me and Enthoven, with assistance from others). Changes include, among other things:
 - Alternative target systems, including presidential options to **withhold** attacks: a) on China (!); b) on Moscow (to permit war-ending. This was fiercely resisted by proponents of “decapitation”); c) on or near Soviet or Chinese cities; d) on military targets in satellite nations near cities.
 - Tighter presidential control, and survivable control by civilian authority.
 - Elimination of “bonus” civilian damage; options minimizing civilian deaths and collateral damage from fallout.
- “My” revised guidance is the basis for the operational war plans under Kennedy—reviewed by me for Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric in 1962, 1963 and 1964—and has been reported by insiders and scholars to have become the basic framework for U.S. strategic war plans ever since.

- In contrast to guidance prior to 1961, my Top Secret guidance paper has never been completely declassified. However, my own copies of it, along with my memos to the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Defense highlighting and explaining the changes from the Eisenhower plans, survive in my possession after loss of the buried files.
- My effort to alert superiors to the dangers of stationing nuclear weapons off Iwakuni in Japan (unreflected in the records of the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Nuclear Affairs, and lied about by the Navy) leads to McNamara's ordering the situation changed. His directive is withdrawn after vehement protest from the Chief of Naval Operations (who asks, unsuccessfully, that I be fired from RAND).
- My urgent effort to have the President possess and read a copy of the JCS war plan (to scare him into directing radical changes) is a failure. McGeorge Bundy's request for a copy for the president is summarily rebuffed by the Joint Staff. The JCS default on a promise to accompany their oral briefing on the plan to Bundy, McNamara and Gilpatric at the Pentagon with a copy of the plan itself, though they purport to do so. When Gilpatric shows me the document they have given him, it is merely a copy of the top secret briefing, which omits crucial details of the actual plan (including the broad range of circumstances under which it is designed to be executed, exterminating the "Sino-Soviet Bloc" and much else).
- At Gilpatric's request, I draft a long set of top secret questions he sends to the JCS ostensibly relating to their briefing (actually, reflecting their real plan, which I retrieve from the Air Staff). These are designed to convey that someone working for the Office of Secretary of Defense has a detailed knowledge of "where the bodies are buried": the controversies and highly questionable compromises the JCS have so far concealed from the Office of Secretary of Defense. Thus dissimulation by them is risky, though honest answers are unthinkable. In the words of Bundy's deputy Robert Komer, on reading my list of queries in the White House: "If these were Japanese generals, they would have to commit suicide on reading these questions."
- American generals are less sensitive; after repeated requests for more time, the Deputy Secretary's questions ultimately go unanswered. But as he calculates, they end resistance to the new guidance.
- One of the questions from my list is separated out by Komer and sent to the JCS in the name of President Kennedy: "If your plans for general war are carried out as planned, how many will die in the Soviet Union and China?" This one and a subsequent question asking for the worldwide death toll, surprisingly, does get a fast answer, mentioned in the Introduction above. 600 million dead.

- In a visit to SAC Headquarters in Omaha in August, I learn that SAC Commander Thomas Powers approves my guidance. I also learn, from the chief of SAC war plans, that Powers believes the Soviets at that time have “1000” operational ICBMs (the U.S. has 40); though, somewhat contradictorily, he has joined with the other Chiefs in assuring Kennedy that if the Berlin Crisis should force the president to order a U.S. first strike, the U.S. would suffer no more than 10 million deaths.
- Kennedy finds this JCS estimate un reassuring: as he does a “well-designed” first-strike option with a comparable predicted result presented to him (without my knowledge) by some of my civilian colleagues. Nevertheless, in a speech on Berlin, Kennedy announces an increase in the defense budget, mobilizes reserves, and calls on Americans to build fallout shelters.

8. Sputnik, the Missile Gap, & its Secret Collapse/Reversal

- In late September, 1961, a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) reports the astonishing fact, reflecting comprehensive coverage of Soviet sites by the secret program of satellite reconnaissance, that the Soviets have less than ten ICBMs. I learn in the White House that the actual number, confirmed in the next NIE, is four. Not the one thousand estimated by SAC, not the 120 or 160 mentioned as likely in the most recent NIE of June: **four**. The U.S. had ten times as many.
- In addition, we had some 60 IRBMs in range of Russia in Italy, Britain and Turkey; about 120 Polaris submarine warheads at sea; and about **2000** long-range strategic bombers (the Soviets had 192), plus about a thousand tactical bombers in range of the Soviet Union. (check numbers)
- Since 1958, NIE’s have not been made available to contractors like RAND, so that RAND studies since then have reflected exclusively the high missile gap estimate of 1958—as though fixed in amber—and the still-higher Air Force estimates since then. Having read the SNIE in the Pentagon and been told the precise figure and the basis for it, I convene a top secret briefing at RAND in Santa Monica to bring department heads and project leaders into the new world. For the first time in a briefing by me, I accompany my talk with charts: large, hand-lettered sheets of briefing paper on a standing easel, each page meticulously stamped top secret at top and bottom.
 - One: “Yes, Virginia, there is a missile gap.”
 - Two: “It is currently running 10 to 1.”
 - Three: “In our favor.”

- “How would they know?” is the first question. I can’t tell them the answer to that, because I’m not supposed to know. The reconnaissance satellite program is classified higher than top secret; my being told about it is a very unusual violation of the regulations, since I don’t yet have that clearance. I hope to get it (as I do) and I don’t repeat the violation by telling my colleagues that the evidence is from comprehensive coverage of the Soviet Union with high-resolution satellite photographs, a program whose existence is unknown to them despite their top secret clearances.
- **No one** in that audience believes the news I bring from Washington. I am, after all, saying that all their urgent efforts of the past seven years or so have been misdirected toward illusionary problems, based on wildly false premises about Soviet motives and capabilities. They have been working furiously in a dreamworld: a nightmare, but one from which they resist awakening. The amber preserving their distorted image of reality holds firm, for months to years in Santa Monica.

7. An “Unconscious” Nuclear Threat: Berlin, US First Use Planning, & the Risks of Nuclear War

- I participate in a high-level Berlin Crisis Game involving high officials as players. In light of Khrushchev’s belligerence and supposed ICBM superiority—he has just renewed atmospheric testing and exploded the largest warhead ever tested, equivalent to 58 million tons of high explosive—and overwhelming Soviet conventional forces in the vicinity of Berlin, the game leads some participants to conclude: “Berlin is hopeless; we have to withdraw.”
- After my briefing at RAND on the new SNIE, I draft a speech for Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric publicly exposing the myth of the missile gap and proclaiming U.S. nuclear superiority: thus ending the Berlin Crisis of 1961 but contributing to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

“Hidden Histories”

8. Secrecy, the Cuban Missile Crisis, & the Risks of Nuclear War

After spending the first half of 1962 writing my Ph.D. thesis for Harvard, “Risk, Ambiguity and Decision,” I am called to the Pentagon by Harry Rowen for consultation on the night President Kennedy announces the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and his initial response of a blockade. Sleeping, when possible, on a couch in the Pentagon over the next five days, I participate in two of the three working groups reporting to the Executive Committee of the NSC (EXCOMM). That experience and my crisis study the next year leads to major findings not yet revealed—until this memoir--on the origins and ending of the crisis.

9. My Top Secret Nuclear Crises Study

In addition to my major study—with interagency access to studies and data at levels higher than top secret—of the Cuban crisis, along with a number of other nuclear crises, my research in 1964 and later uncovers the U.S. use of nuclear weapons--as a pistol is used by pointing it, whether or not the trigger is pulled--by Presidents Truman (Iran 1946, Berlin 1948 and Korea 1950); Eisenhower (Korea 1953; Indochina 1954, Quemoy, 1954 and 1958; Lebanon/Iraq/Kuwait 1958, deterring North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, 1956-60; Berlin 1958-60); JFK (Berlin 1961, Cuba 1962).

10. “As Explosive as a Nuclear Bomb”: Proliferation, the Gilpatric Report, & the Risks of Nuclear War

After India secretly requests help with a nuclear weapons test following the Chinese explosion in 1964 (known to me as a Pentagon official at the time, never before revealed), internal discussions disclose high-level skepticism, by Secretary of Rusk in particular, about the very desirability of opposing nuclear proliferation by "our friends," like India, or even Japan or Germany. McGeorge Bundy warns that leaks of this internal deviation from our declared opposition to proliferation "would be as explosive as an atom bomb."

The ensuing high-level Gilpatric Committee rejects the Rusk position and secretly proposes an anti-proliferation program calling for major changes in U.S. nuclear posture and first-use policy. Declassified only a few years ago, it remains the best blueprint to this day for an effective campaign against proliferation led by the U.S. But LBJ secretly rejects the program, and it remains largely unfulfilled after forty-five years during which American "non-proliferation" efforts actually premised on maintaining U.S. strategic "superiority" have been essentially a hoax.

[Taking this out? 10. “A Policy To Which I Was Wholly Opposed”: Joining the Pentagon & the Escalation of the Vietnam War]

[put the delegation in the delegation chapter] [put first use against North Vietnam into the First Use Chapter] [China, 1964, into the anti-proliferation chapter]

I become a full-time official (GS-18, highest civil service rank) on the day of the Tonkin Gulf hoax and attack. I learn that LBJ has secretly renewed delegation of nuclear weapons authority and intends to widen the Vietnam War--in direct contradiction to his two main campaign pledges opposing each of these, as he runs against Goldwater who publicly advocates both. I also learn that nuclear first-use attack is discussed against China 1964 (before and after its first test); against North Vietnam 1964, 1965, 1966 (recommended by Eisenhower), and 1968.]

11. “Those Were Very Good Lectures”: Nixon’s Nuclear Madman Threats & the Escalation of the Vietnam War

President Nixon enacts his "madman policy" (foreshadowed in my analyses of Hitler's threats, as known to Kissinger) in nuclear threats against North Vietnam 1969-73. His fears of my knowledge of these and other plans for escalation—plausibly known to me from my White House contacts from my work for him in late 1968 and early 1969 drafting an “Options” paper on Vietnam and questions he put to the national security bureaucracy—lead to his criminal efforts in 1971-72 to stop me from exposing his secret policy. Exposure of these criminal actions against me by his White House “plumbers” is critical to his resignation facing impeachment, making possible the ending of the war nine months later.

Part II: Hidden Histories

Epilogue: The Construction of Instability: US First Use Threats & the Risks of Nuclear War

I discuss first-use threats and the "damage-limiting" preemptive first-strike strategy that supports them which persist under Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama: precluding effective anti-proliferation efforts, risking "limited" nuclear wars and maintaining on hair-trigger alert, along with Russia, Doomsday Machines that threaten the survival of all complex life on earth.

--history of strategic bombing

- evolution towards city bombing/obliteration of cities
- implications for Hiroshima, Nagasaki, & nuclear war planning

--effect of nuclear weapons on post/pre-war US policy

- Berlin, division of Germany, rearmament of Germany
- NATO first-use policy & the risks of thermonuclear war
- division of Indochina
- exclusion of Soviet influence from the Middle East/Iran
- role of the bomb

--SAC emphasis on preemption, damage-limiting, counterforce,

(Part II: Hidden Histories

Part III: Histories Hidden from Me (at the time)

--first use US nuclear threats

[I actually did study the Quemoy crisis in 1964 as government/RAND consultant in nuclear crisis study and was also aware of nuclear threats in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis and 1961 Berlin Crisis, and possibly against China in 1964; but I didn't learn of Nixon's threats until 1969 and especially 1974, via Roger Morris; threat to Dobrynin in 1969

--nuclear threats; start studying in 1964, based on unclassified and recently declassified; see larger pattern (for the first time)

--now I understand the US first strike damage limiting posture in entirely new light in backing up our first use nuclear threats in the world, in NATO and periphery, to deter Soviet second use in response to US first use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet ally (in NATO; it's purportedly to counter Soviet escalation/2nd use in response to Soviets themselves, or respond to a Soviet conventional attack.

--Cuban Missile Crisis: 1976, Operation Mongoose! Revelations from conferences leading up to 1992 revelations about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and delegation in Cuba (like US)! (& submarine crisis, 2002-a few words away from nuclear war)!

--RFK threats; from earlier 64 study

--K knew that our invasion

--key theme: ordinary human madness (in groups); willingness to inflict apocalyptic damage in response to national defeat or occupation (or personal humiliation!)

--this made it credible that weapons controlled by West Germans, French or British would be a deterrent! Suez.

--Castro admits that he recommended a Soviet first strike if US invasion of Cuba commenced; accepted prospect of total annihilation of Cuba; though he believed

-TR-to best of my memory, Mao also believed in Soviet superiority in 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis and K is making threats. K threatens that use of nukes in China would lead to World War III and Eisenhower and Dulles appear to accept that this is true! Or so they say in secret!

--Dulles: World War III doesn't seem worth it until you look at the effects of not standing up/backing down in a crisis.

[parenthetical note: easy for people to misread; difference between launching and threatening or risking a war] [World War I!!!!]

---K making threats against the British in the Suez crisis; and later, our rockets will fly automatically (Berlin), missiles, sausages!

--nuclear capable matador missiles in Taiwan, and delegation to West Germans, and introduction of nukes in Korea in 57-58. [check on this] - secret relationship of this to crises!

-the Athens no cities-counterforce speech, made public in Ann Arbor (in 1964?) (last draft of which I wrote)

-small national forces vulnerable and incredible (McNamara) but they're actually not.

--Eisenhower & Dulles policy of rollback, and delegating weapons to US allies in divided states; role in precipitating the nuclear crises;

--Turks had nuclear capable aircraft ready to go; and IRBMs; and Germany; (how many fingers on the button)

(Chapter Title: How Many Fingers on the Button?)

--K believes (according to Trachtenberg), US deployment of nukes in foreign countries is transition to national control to those countries which Eisenhower was willing to see, and effectively true in Germany, Turkey and for K in Turkey)

--whole NATO apparatus is substitute to simply giving West Germans independent control of nuclear weapons;

-pressure on allies; if you don't give us the nukes, we'll build our own)